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"FIGHTING SLURS":
CONTEMPORARY FIGHTING WORDS AND THE
QUESTION OF CRIMINALLY PUNISHABLE RACIAL
EPITHETS
WILLIAM C. NEVIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Smith,' the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin was faced
with the somewhat novel question of whether racist Facebook com-
ments could serve as the basis for disorderly conduct and unauthor-
ized use of a computer system charges. The case against Thomas
Smith began when the Village of Arena police department posted a
Facebook status update thanking area residents that assisted law en-
forcement in locating two suspects.2 However, comments on the po-
lice department's post took a turn as some Facebook users com-
plained about past actions by department officers.3 Smith posted two
comments in reply to those complaints, writing: "Fuck the fucking
cops they ant shit but fucking racist basturds an fucking all of y'all
who is racist [sic]," and "Fuck them nigers policy bitchs wat the you
got on us not a darn thing so fuck off dicks [sic]." 4
*Instructor of Journalism and Speech at the University of West Alabama. B.A.,
2007, Communication, University of Alabama; J.D., 2010, University of Alabama
School of Law; Ph.D. 2014, Communication and Information Sciences, Universi-
ty of Alabama. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at regional and
national meetings of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Communication. The author would like to thank the editors of this journal for
their work inpublishing this Article and his wife Kate for her continued love and
support.
'No. 2013AP2516-CR, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 537 (Wis. Ct. App. July 13, 2014).
2See id. at *2.
3 See id. at *2-3.
4 Id. at *3.
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Because of those two comments, Smith was arrested on
charges of disorderly conduct and the unlawful use of a computer-
ized communication system under a theory that his comments were
"fighting words,"5 or words "which by their very utterance inflict in-
jury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."6 A jury con-
victed Smith, and he appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin, where his conviction was overturned.7
The ruling for the defendant was based primarily on one un-
escapable truth about the fighting words doctrine-namely, that it
has "rarely if ever been applied outside of the face-to-face context."8
Thus, because Smith's screed was only online-not directed to
someone else in person-it could not meet the traditional definition
of a fighting word, which is communication that could result in a rea-
sonable person resorting to physical violence.9 With the physical dis-
tance between Smith and the Arena police officers, there was simply
no possibility of an immediate breach of the peace. Therefore,
Smith's conviction could not rest on the fighting words doctrine.
In examining Smith's actual communication, rather than
simply evaluating his means of communicating-the court made two
points: (1) that it was difficult to determine exactly who was the tar-
get of Smith's "nigger" slur; and (2) that all authorities cited by pros-
ecutors involved the in-person use of racial slurs.' 0 From there, the
court noted the "racially charged" environment in which the com-
ments were made, and agreed with the prosecution that "context
matters."" It did not, however, explore whether racial slurs can
serve as the basis for a successful fighting words prosecution.
s See id. at *3-4 (noting that a pretrial motion to dismiss charges on First
Amendment grounds was denied after prosecutors argued that the comments
represented fighting words).
6 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
7 Smith, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 537, at *10.
8 Id. at *8-9.
9 See id.
1o See id. at *11.
11 See id. at *11-12 ("[T]he State points to evidence that the juveniles the police
arrested were black and were detained at gunpoint by private citizens until the
police arrived.").
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This Article will do what the Smith court did not: specifically
examine whether racial slurs are fighting words under the current
understanding of the doctrine created in 1941 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.12 Part II will trace
the development of the fighting words doctrine through Chaplinsky
and subsequent cases at the Supreme Court.13 Part III will examine
successful fighting words prosecutions of the last five years, while
Part IV will examine conflicting case law on racial slurs as fighting
words, looking at cases that support the idea that racial slurs are
fighting wordS 14 and discussing courts reaching a contrary result.15
Part V will then examine the normative question of whether racial
slurs should be fighting words by comparing racial slurs as fighting
words to racial misidentification as grounds for defamation. Finally,
the Article will conclude in Part VI by suggesting that whatever con-
troversy that exists in the matter of racial slurs as fighting words
should be resolved in favor of treating slurs as prohibitable under
the doctrine.
II. FIGHTING WORDS DOCTRINE: A HISTORY
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court's 1941 decision
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire established the "fighting words" ex-
ception to the First Amendment in American jurisprudence.1 6 The
defendant in that case, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses named
12 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
13 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971).
14 See State v. Myers, No. CA2012-12-027, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 3319 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 4, 2014); In re A.R., 781 N.W.2d 644 (N.D. 2010); In re H.K, 778
N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 2010); In re Shane EE., 851 N.Y.S.2d. 711 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008); In re John M., 36 P.3d 772 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Bailey v. State, 972
S.W.2d 239 (Ark. 1998); Lee v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763. (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693 (N.C. 1997); Sims v. Montgomery Cnty.
Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990); City of Wichita v. Hughes, 798 P.2d
972 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988).
1s See State v. Dotson, No. 93 C.A. 250, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5567 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 13, 1995); People v. Livio, 725 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2000).
16 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568.
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Walter Chaplinsky, was arrested in 1940 for calling a Rochester, New
Hampshire city marshal "a God damned racketeer" and "a damned
Fascist" after a crowd caused a disturbance while Chaplinsky was at-
tempting to distribute literature.17 Chaplinsky was specifically
charged with a violation of a state law that made it a crime to ad-
dress any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in any street or other public place.' 8 Additionally, the
law prohibited calling such persons by offensive or derisive names
or making any noises or exclamation with the intent "to deride, of-
fend or annoy, or to prevent such persons from pursuing their lawful
business or occupation." 9
After Chaplinsky was unable to introduce evidence at trial to
show he was provoked, he was convicted of the charge, and his con-
viction was upheld by the New Hampshire Supreme Court. 20
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court affirmed Chaplin-
sky's conviction. 21 Early in the Court's unanimous majority opinion
written by Justice Frank Murphy, the Court stated that "it is well un-
derstood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and
under all circumstances" 22 -a declaration that certainly did not bode
well for the defendant. Following that statement, Justice Murphy ex-
plained, "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited clas-
ses of speech" that are subject to criminal sanction even under the
Constitution, with those categories of speech including "the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace."2 3 Justice Murphy then
quoted the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision upholding
17 Id. at 569-70 (1942) (quoting Chaplinsky's statement, "[Tihe whole govern-
ment of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists.").
18 Id. at 569 (citation omitted).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 570; see also Burton Caine, The Trouble with "Fighting Words": Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be
Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 441, 446-47 (2004) (describing how Chaplinsky was
likely physically assaulted before he spoke to the town marshal).
21 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
22 Id. at 571.
23 Id at 572.
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Chaplinsky's conviction to define the parameters of fighting words
speech:
The test is what men of common intelligence
would understand would be words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight . . . . The
English language has a number of words and
expressions which by general consent are
'fighting words' when said without a disarming
smile . ... Such words, as ordinary men know,
are likely to cause a fight. So are threatening,
profane or obscene revilings.24
Under that test, as the unanimous Court concluded, Chaplinsky had
violated the state statute in question because "[a]rgument is unnec-
essary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damn racketeer' and
'damn Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace."25
In addition to relying heavily on the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court decision-an opinion that the Court quoted "extensive-
ly," according to Professor Burton Caine26-Justice Murphy also
premised important portions of the Chaplinsky opinion on a previous
Court decision that suggests a much broader prohibition on speech
than the modern fighting words doctrine. Justice Murphy quoted
from the Court's prior decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut27 to state
that to "[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument."28
Cantwell, decided a year before Chaplinsky, arose out of simi-
lar facts. 29 Again, three Jehovah's Witnesses were arrested for solicit-
ing in violation of state law and breaching the peace for door-to-door
24 Id. at 573 (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (N.H. 1941)).
2s Id. at 574.
26 Caine, supra note 20, at 449.
27 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
28 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-10).
29 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301.
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preaching. 30 The Cantwell Court, however, overturned the defend-
ants' convictions.31 In addressing the breach of the peace charge, Jus-
tice Owen Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that the de-
fendant "was upon a public street, where he had a right to be, and
where he had a right peacefully to impart his views to others."32 Fur-
thermore, there was no evidence to show that the defendant was
"noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive" in his proselytizing.33 Yet
Justice Roberts observed that at least one witness testified at trial
that he felt like hitting the defendant 3 4-a curious note given that
Cantwell presaged Chaplinsky.3 s
While the Cantwell court held for the defendant, at least two
passages would serve to lay the foundation for upholding Chaplin-
sky's conviction. Just before the Cantwell Court's observation that ep-
ithets and abuse are not protected under the Constitution, Justice
Roberts noted:
One may, however, be guilty of [breaching the
peace] if he commit[s] acts or make[s] state-
ments likely to provoke violence and disturb-
ance of good order, even though no such even-
tuality be intended. Decisions to this effect are
many, but examination discloses that, in practi-
cally all, the provocative language which was
held to amount to a breach of the peace consist-
ed of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks di-
rected to the person of the hearer.36
30 Id. at 300.
31 Id. at 311. The soliciting conviction, based on a state law that prevented fund-
raising for religious, charitable, or philanthropic causes without prior approval
from the state, was overturned because the Court found the law to be an uncon-
stitutional infringement on religious liberty. See id. at 301-02, 307.
32 Id. at 308.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 309.
35 See id.
36 Id. at 309-10.
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Cantwell's preaching, despite its natural tendency to offend Catholics
and all those who adhere to organized religion,37 failed to meet this
standard of "profane, indecent, or abusive remarks," according to
Justice Roberts. 38 Yet, the Court still signaled what might be pro-
scribable language and, furthermore, argued that insults are outside
the purview of the First Amendment.39 The Cantwell Court would
hint at the means of silencing such offensive speech at the end of its
opinion, as Justice Roberts concluded: "[I]n the absence of a statute
narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constitut-
ing a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State,
the petitioner's communication ... raised no such clear and present
menace to public peace and order . .. "40 The passage thus implied
that a narrowly drawn criminal statute could very well serve as the
grounds to punish offensive speech of the "profane, indecent, or abu-
sive" nature. Indeed, in Chaplinsky, the defendant's conviction was
upheld in part because the New Hampshire statute in question was
"narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific con-
duct[.]" 41
Even though Cantwell and Chaplinsky both suggested a broad
interpretation of the newly created fighting words doctrine, the Su-
preme Court subsequently narrowed its application in a series of
cases. The first of those cases, Cohen v. California,42 came 30 years af-
ter Chaplinsky and saw the Court overturn a criminal conviction for
wearing a jacket in public that bore the words "Fuck the Draft."4 3 In
writing for the Court's majority, Justice John Marshall Harlan defined
37 See id. at 309 ("The record played by Cantwell embodies a general attack on
all organized religious systems as instruments of Satan and injurious to man; it
then singles out the Roman Catholic Church for strictures couched in
terms which naturally would offend not only persons of that persuasion, but all
others who respect the honestly held religious faith of their fellows.").
38 Id.
39 Id. at 309-10.
40 Id at 311.
41 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
42 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
43 Id. at 16. The defendant, Paul Robert Cohen, wore the jacket in a Los Angeles
County Courthouse corridor, and he did so "knowing that the words were on
the jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against
the Vietnam War and the draft," according to his testimony at trial. Id
fighting words as "those personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction."44 The
jacket, however, did not represent a fighting word because it was not
directed to a specific individual.45 "No individual actually or likely to
be present," Justice Harlan concluded, "could reasonably have re-
garded the words on [Cohen's] jacket as a direct personal insult."4 6
Thus, the first major limitation on the fighting words doctrine was
that speech had to be directly addressed to a specific individual ra-
ther than a crowd or a general population to be constitutionally
prohibitable, such as the individuals in the Los Angeles County
Courthouse on the day Cohen wore his jacket.
A year after Cohen, the Court further limited the application
of the doctrine and attempted to better define it with the 1972 deci-
sion in Gooding v. Wilson.47 In Gooding, the Court reviewed a consti-
tutional challenge to a Georgia statute that made it a misdemeanor to
use "opprobrious words or abusive language" that tended to cause a
breach of the peace.48 While the facts of the underlying conviction in
Gooding involved a Vietnam War protester saying to police officers,
"White son of a bitch, I'll kill you," "You son of a bitch, I'll choke you
to death," "You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again,
I'll cut you all to pieces," 4 9 the Court's task was to examine the consti-
tutionality of the state law and how it had been applied by Georgia
courts.50 While the Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice
William Brennan, found that the state law was successfully narrowed
in principle to prohibit only fighting words,5 ' the Court determined
that in practice Georgia courts had expanded the limits of Chaplinsky
44 Id. at 20.
45 Id.
46 Id.
7 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
4 8 Id. at 519 (quoting Georgia Code Ann. § 26-6303).
4 Id. at 520 n.1. It is worth noting that the defendant in Gooding was originally
convicted under the fighting words-and not true threat-doctrine. See gener-
ally Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (establishing the Court's "true threat" doc-
trine).
50 See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520 (noting that only Georgia state courts could au-
thoritatively construe § 26-6303).
51 See id. at 524.
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to cover otherwise protected speech.52 In reaching the decision, Jus-
tice Brennan noted that appellate courts in the state had upheld con-
victions for exclamations of "God damn" and refused to dismiss a
criminal charge for accusing someone of lying.53 Furthermore, Justice
Brennan observed that at least one Georgia court speculated that
fighting words might still result in a breach of the peace "at some fu-
ture time, when the person to whom it was addressed might be no
longer hampered by physical inability, present conditions, or official
position."5 4 The expansion of the definition of fighting words to cover
mere insults and blasphemy, especially when combined with the re-
moval of the likelihood of instant physical violence, in essence "li-
censes the jury to create its own standard in each case" and mandat-
ed a finding of unconstitutionality, according to Justice Brennan.55
With Gooding, therefore, the Court reinforced that fighting words
must be beyond mere insults and they must be likely to cause instant
physical violence.
Three months after Gooding was decided, the Court gave
more hints as to what were not constitutionally prohibitable fighting
words in Rosenfeld v. NewJersey,5 6 an order that vacated a criminal
conviction for shouting "motherfucker" four times during a rant at a
public school board meeting57 in light of both Cohen and Gooding.
The dissents in Rosenfeld, however, also applied to other cases from
Louisiana and Oklahoma58 that resulted in convictions for address-
ing police officers as "god damn motherfucking police,"59 and refer-
ring to officers as "motherfucking fascist pig cops" and a particular
officer as a "black motherfucking pig."60 Although the majority gave
no explicit reasoning for vacating the conviction other than citations
to the Court's decisions in Cohen and Gooding, three dissenters-
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Associate Justices Harry Blackmun
52 See id. at 524-25.
s3 Id. at 525.
54 Id. at 526 (quoting Elmore v. State, 83 S.E. 799, 800 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914)).
ss Id. at 528 (quoting Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937)).
56 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
57 Id. at 904 (Powell, J., dissenting).
S8 See id. at 902 (Burger, J., dissenting).
s9 Id. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 911.
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and William Rehnquist-wrote to express their disapproval with the
majority's decision. Chief Justice Burger wrote of his disappointment
in especially apocalyptic terms:
It is barely a century since men in parts of this
country carried guns constantly because the law
did not afford protection. In that setting, the
words used in these cases, if directed toward
such an armed civilian, could well have led to
death or serious bodily injury. When we under-
mine the general belief that the law will give
protection against fighting words and profane
and abusive language such as the utterances in-
volved in these cases, we take steps to return to
the law of the jungle. These three cases, like
Gooding, are small but symptomatic steps. If
continued, this permissiveness will tend further
to erode public confidence in the law-that sub-
tle but indispensable ingredient of ordered lib-
erty.61
Despite the Chief Justice's objections, Rosenfeld at least suggests that,
again, mere insults and profanity-even when directed at specific
individuals-cannot serve as fighting words without the likelihood
of imminent physical violence.
In the Court's most recent case to address fighting words,
R.A.V. v. St. Paul,62 the Justices attempted to shape the means by
which states can regulate fighting words rather than fundamentally
altering the doctrine itself.6 3 In that case, the Court examined the
constitutionality of a St. Paul, Minnesota city ordinance that made it
a crime to place on either public or private property a symbol tradi-
tionally associated with racial hatred such as a burning cross or a
swastika, in which an individual "knows or has reasonable grounds
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
61 Id. at 902 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
62 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
63 See id. at 381 ("Assuming, arguendo, that all of the expression reached by the
ordinance is proscribable under the 'fighting words' doctrine, we nonetheless
conclude that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits oth-
erwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech address-
es.").
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race, color, creed, religion or gender."64 The Court, in a majority opin-
ion by Justice Antonin Scalia, found the ordinance to be an unconsti-
tutional content-based restriction on speech and overturned the
criminal conviction of a teenager who had been found guilty of burn-
ing a cross in a black family's yard.65 The law was impermissible un-
der the First Amendment because it was a ban on fighting words "of
whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or
religious intolerance." 66 Thus, instead of a complete ban on fighting
words-a ban which could have included racial slurs-the city's tar-
geted attempt to deal with racial and religious prejudice was an un-
constitutional attempt to censor speech.67 As Justice Scalia explained,
"The politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostility-but
not through the means of imposing unique limitations upon speakers
who (however benightedly) disagree."68
Importantly, R.A.V. did not foreclose attempts to punish racial
slurs through the fighting words doctrine; rather, the case only sig-
naled that the Court would not allow statutes that only punished hate
speech and other intolerant forms of communication using the con-
stitutionally acceptable prohibition on fighting words.69 R.A.V. also
tacitly reaffirmed Chaplinsky and its progeny, but as Cohen, Gooding,
and Rosenfeld show, Justices have not always been able to agree on
what is and what is not a fighting word.70 As the doctrine has devel-
oped, there are ultimately four elements in removing constitutional
protection from speech under a fighting words theory: (1) the con-
tent of the speech must consist of personally abusive speech directed
at a specific individual; (2) the target of the speech must be in such
close proximity as to create the possibility of physical violence; (3)
the target must be likely to retaliate; and (4) the violent reaction to
64 Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
65 Id. at 379-81.
66 Id. at 394.
67 See id. at 396 ("An ordinance not limited to the favored topics, for example,
would have precisely the same beneficial effect. In fact the only interest distinc-
tively served by the content limitation is that of displaying the city council's
special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out.").
6 8 Id.
69 See id. at 396.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 43-62.
the speech must be immediate.71 Without any further guidance from
the Court, the definition in Gooding of fighting words-"words that
have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to
whom, individually, the remark is addressed"-is perhaps the best
insight into determining whether racial slurs-or any words for that
matter-can be fighting words.72
III. CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES OF FIGHTING WORDS: SUCCESSFUL
PROSECUTIONS FROM 2010-2015
Contemporary courts have found that a variety of insults and
profanities can be considered fighting words.7 3 Additionally, for
some courts, it may simply be a matter of profanity in the wrong set-
ting, such as in front of a potentially hostile crowd74 or a captive au-
dience.75 Other courts have determined that threats or attempts to
goad others into fighting can naturally be considered fighting words,
while some courts have relied on gestures or the manner of presen-
tation to find defendants liable for speech that would otherwise be
protected.76
In cases that focused almost exclusively on the content of the
speech, recent courts have found that a variety of obscenities-even
single or isolated words-can be prohibited fighting words. The
Eleventh District Court of Appeals of Ohio suggested in a 2014 case
that "asshole" and a request to "stay the [fuck] away" could support a
disorderly conduct conviction under a theory of fighting words.7 7
Likewise, the U.S. District Court in New Hampshire found that a sin-
71 Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and E-Mails: Can a Dispar-
aged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 4-5 (2010).
72 405 U.S. at 524 (internal quotations omitted).
7 3 See infra text accompanying notes 78-83.
74 See State v. Frazier, No. 25338, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2683, at *23 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 29, 2011).
7 See State v. Nelson, No. A14-0356, 2014 Minn. App. LEXIS 1305, at *9 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2014).
76 See infra text accompanying notes 99-103.
" State v. Wiley, No. 2013-P-0067, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 5582, at *9-10 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2014).
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gle taunt of "suck my dick" could "cross[] the threshold into the
realm of fighting words."7 8
Other courts have found that the repeated use of profanity
and insults can constitute fighting words. For example, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Alabama concluded that
"[t]here can be little doubt that repeatedly calling a 13 year-old girl a
'whore' and a 'slut' in the presence of the girl's mother serves no
purpose other than to provoke a confrontation[.]" 79 The Tenth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals of Ohio likewise upheld the disorderly conduct
conviction of a defendant who "repeatedly called" a bus driver "a few
bitches, mother fuckers, [and] full of shit."80 Finally, in People v.
Craig,8 1 the Third District Appellate Court of Illinois upheld the dis-
orderly conduct conviction of a woman who yelled "vulgarities about
being fired, 'over and over again"' while witnesses "wait[ed] for fists
to start flying."82
In some cases, it is not the simple presence of obscenities or
profanity that makes for fighting words, but rather the environment
in which they are communicated. In State v. Nelson,83 the Court of
Appeals of Minnesota noted that an on-duty liquor store clerk was a
"captive audience" who could not leave the job as a customer called
the clerk "a piece of [shit]" and a "[fucking asshole]."84 In State v. Fra-
zier,85 the Ninth District Court of Appeals of Ohio found that a de-
fendant created "a public spectacle that threatened the safety of law
enforcement officials [] as well as a crowd of 50 to 70 people" 6 after
78 Byrnes v. City of Manchester, 848 F. Supp. 2d 146, 158 (D. N.H. 2012).
79 Bethel v. City of Mobile, No. 10-0009-CG-N, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36972, at
*19 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 5, 2011).
80 City of Columbus v. Miller, No. 09AP-770, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1161, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2010).
81 People v. Craig, No. 3-10-0088, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 1122 (Ill. App. Ct. May 20,
2011).
82 Id. at *3, *5.
83 State v. Nelson, No. A14-0356, 2014 Minn. App. LEXIS 1305 (Minn. Ct App.
Dec. 22, 2014).
84 Id. at *7, *9.
85 State v. Frazier, No. 25338, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2683 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29,
2011).86 Id. at 46
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she called police officers "crooked a** cops," "b****," "mother f******"
and "f****** crooked a** cops."8 7
Outside of simple profanity, recent court decisions show that
threats or simple attempts to encourage another person to fight can
be considered fighting words. The Court of Appeals of Kansas noted
that the presence of a threat was "merely another factor" to be con-
sidered in a fighting words determination as it upheld the disorderly
conduct conviction of a defendant who told his ex-wife, "I hate you,
you F'ing cunt. I hate you bitch. I'm going to get you."88 Similarly, a
Pennsylvania appellate court found that a "volatile and combative"
defendant was guilty of disorderly conduct after repeatedly pointing
his finger at others, suggesting he had access to firearms, and asking
a principal, "[H]ow would you like it if you left work here one night
at six (6) o'clock in the evening and there was somebody waiting for
you outside by your car?"89 In the case of In re TW.,9o the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeals of Ohio found that while verbal criticism of po-
lice was protected by the First Amendment, such protection did not
include "threats of violence to kill the officers and their families,"
which instead constituted fighting words.9 ' Finally, the Third District
Appellate Court of Illinois noted in Craig that the defendant re-
marked that her former employer would "pay for it" after firing her,
emphasizing that threats or the appearance of threats can be a factor
in a determination of fighting words. 92
In addition to threats, attempting to provoke another indi-
vidual to physical violence has logically been found to constitute
fighting words in recent cases. In State v. Ford,93 the Court of Appeals
87 Id. at *44.
88 State v. Meadors, No. 105,702, 2012 Kan. App. LEXIS 46, 268 P.3d 12, at *1, *7
(Kan. Ct. App. filed Jan. 27, 2012).
89 Commonwealth v. Vos, No. 200918905, 2012 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 206,
at *6 (C. P., Allegheny County May 16, 2012).
90 In re T.W., No. 1-12-16, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5127 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17,
2012).
91 Id. at *18. The juvenile in the case also threatened to "slap the white" off an
officer's face. Id. at *17.
92 People v. Craig, No. 3-10-0088, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 1122, at *13 (lll. App. Ct.
May 20, 2011).
93 State v. Ford, No. A09-632, 2010 Minn. App. LEXIS 325 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
13, 2010).
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of Minnesota determined that the defendant uttered constitutionally
unprotected fighting words when he told a former co-worker that he
would "like to put [his] fist into [the former co-worker's] body" and
that he wanted to "kick [his] [ass]" and to "meet [him] outside."94 The
Supreme Court of North Dakota reached the same conclusion in Re-
bel v. Rebel9s as the Court upheld a two-year disorderly conduct re-
straining order resulting from an incident in which a woman called
her husband's ex-wife a "fucking liar" and suggested the ex-wife was
"not brave enough" to get out of her car.96 The Court determined that
the language used to entice the ex-wife to leave the vehicle constitut-
ed fighting words that "compromised" the woman's "safety, security,
and privacy."97
Finally, some courts have found lewd or otherwise hostile
gestures to be important in determining whether speech is a fighting
word. The Court of Appeals of Colorado, for example, found that a ju-
venile defendant's companion who pointed his finger at a security
guard added to a breach of the peace in which the defendant "re-
peatedly yelled [fuck you]."98 In a similar case where gestures and
obscenities, considered together, resulted in a fighting words prose-
cution, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found
that a defendant's "aggressive speech" combined with physical arm
"flapping" and "flailing" were both "provocative enough to incite an
average person to violence."99 Lastly, in Watkins v. State,00 the Court
of Appeals of Arkansas upheld the fighting words conviction of a
man described as "alternat[ing] between states of calm and irration-
ality ... flailing his arms, cursing loudly, and eventually demonstrat-
ing a violent demeanor." 01 However, a dissenting justice in the case
94 Id. at *17.
9s 837 N.W.2d 351 (N.D. 2013).
96 Id. at 356.
97 Id. at 359.
98 People ex rel. K.W., 317 P.3d 1237, 1241-42 (Colo. App. 2012).
99 Marsili v. Vill. of Dillonvale, No. 2:12-CV-00741, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65831,
at *39 (S.D. Ohio May 13, 2014).
100 377 S.W.3d 286 (Ct. App. Ark. 2010).
101 Id. at 291.
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argued that the majority's decision served only to "criminalize[]
body language." 102
Successful contemporary fighting words prosecutions, at
least as evidenced by lower court case law from 2010-2015, are
premised on either obscenities, threats or challenges to physical vio-
lence, or obscenities coupled with physical gestures. 03 If lower
courts consider racial slurs to be fighting words, then these general
observations should be the same as obscenities are replaced with ra-
cial slurs. As Part IV will show, aside from courts that have found ra-
cial slurs to be mere insults, racial slurs are generally treated much
like the previously discussed obscenities for the purposes of a
fighting words analysis.
IV. RACIAL SLURS AS FIGHTING WORDS:
LOWER COURTS ADDRESS THE ISSUE
Of the handful of courts to address the question of whether
racial slurs can be fighting words, most-but importantly not all-
courts have determined that such slurs can be properly excluded
from First Amendment protection as fighting words. Part IV will first
examine cases that found slurs to be protected speech (IV.A) before
addressing cases to the contrary (IV.B).
A. Slurs as Protected Speech
Courts overturning convictions for racial slurs have done so
under a variety of rationales, including statutory interpretation, gen-
eral application of the fighting words doctrine, the use of state con-
stitutional law to protect speech that might otherwise be subject to
criminal liability, and a simple categorical declaration that slurs can-
not be fighting words.
The Court of Appeals of Michigan overturned a conviction
based on the defendant calling restaurant customers "spics," but the
court stopped short of determining that racial slurs were or were not
fighting words, as the court's decision instead found that a city ordi-
102 Id. at 292 (Hart, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
1 0 3 See supra text accompanying notes 78-103.
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nance failed to provide constitutionally sufficient notice of prohibit-
ed speech.1 04 The ordinance in question banned "indecent, insulting,
immoral or obscene conduct in any public place,"' 05 but as applied,
"[t]he term 'insulting'. . . did not give adequate forewarning that the
challenged conduct-referencing a person by a racial slur-may rise
to the level of 'fighting words'... [.]"106 Thus, as the court concluded,
the defendant had been unfairly convicted without proper judicial or
statutory notice that the word "spic" could be a fighting word. 07
In cases that applied general principles of the fighting words
doctrine to dismiss charges or overturn criminal convictions, the
Appellate Court of Illinois came to one of the more unusual decisions
in People v. Redwood.08 In that case, the court affirmed a decision0 9
to dismiss charges against a defendant accused of shouting across a
street, "How long are you going to be a shoe-shine boy?" to an Afri-
can-American attorney who had represented him in a previous
case.11 0 The court agreed that "[the attorney] and many others may
find the words offensive," but under Illinois case law, the court con-
cluded the offensiveness simply was not enough to render "shoe-
shine boy" a fighting word." 1 Instead, the court found that, to be a
fighting word under state law, the communication in question had to
contain "an explicit or implied threat."1 2 As the court concluded,
"[V]ulgarities and epithets do not suffice to trigger the State's prose-
cutorial powers and criminal sanctions."113
The court's decision was, again, unusual because fighting
words and threatening speech are generally two distinct proposi-
tions.11 4 By requiring fighting words to contain explicit or implied
threats, the doctrine begins to merge with the prohibition on true
104 People v. Barton, 659 N.W.2d 654, 655, 657 (Ct. App. Mich. 2000).
05 Id. at 655.
106 Id. at 657.
107 Id.
108 780 N.E.2d 760 (App. Ct. 111. 2002).
109 Id. at 762.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 765.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 764.
114 See State v. Meadors, No. 105.702, 2012 Kan. App. LEXIS 46, 268 P.3d 12, at
*1 (Kan. Ct. App. filed Jan. 27, 2012).
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threats and loses an independent reason for excluding speech from
the normal protections of the First Amendment. The court's reason-
ing notwithstanding, in a civil case resulting from the events in Red-
wood, a federal district court concluded that a court could reasona-
bly determine that calling an African-American man a "shoe-shine
boy" was an example of "a'personally abusive epithet[]' which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen (in this case, an African American
man) was 'as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction,"' and, thus, a fighting word.115
Other courts finding particular examples of slurs to be pro-
tected speech have used more traditional applications of the fighting
words doctrine. In Downs v. State,116 a 1971 case involving a criminal
conviction for yelling in a crowded restaurant that "[t]he fucking
niggers in this County are no better than goddamn policemen,"" 7 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland overturned a lower court's finding that
the defendant's speech represented fighting words.1 8 In reaching its
decision, the court noted that fighting words have "some social val-
ue"119 after accounting for the Supreme Court's then-recent decision
in Gooding v. Wilson.120 Therefore, as the court determined, fighting
words cannot be punished on a "per se" basis; instead, they must on-
ly be punished "when there is a likelihood of imminent disturb-
ance."121 Because, as the court reasoned, "there was no direct evi-
dence [the defendant's statement] was spoken to anyone other than
11s Redwood v. Dobson, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44610, *36 (Cent. Dist. Ill. 2005).
116 366 A.2d 41 (Md. 1976).
11 7 Id. at 42.
u8 See Downs v. State, 351 A.2d 166, 171 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1976) ("The coarse,
vulgar remarks passed by appellant in a loud, yelling type of voice, under the
circumstances of this case, we think, entitled the trier of fact to infer that the
strong racial slur inflicted injury and tend[ed] to incite an immediate breach of
the peace. We do not believe that the State must demonstrate that a riot or fight
was on the verge of occurring, and, but for the officer's intervention, would have
happened. In our view, it is enough for the State to show the words used were
such that men of common intelligence would understand that such words
would so arouse emotion that the average person or persons to whom they
were addressed, directly or indirectly at the time spoken, would be stirred to
the point of violent eruption or fighting.") (internal quotations omitted).
119 Downs, 366 A.2d at 44.
12 0 See supra text accompanying notes 47-55 (discussing Gooding).
121 Downs, 366 A.2d at 44.
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the persons sitting in the booth with [him]," the defendant's slur was
protected speech. 122
In another general application of the fighting words doctrine,
a New York state district court found that a telemarketer's use of the
phrase "dumb nigger" in phone calls to potential clients who refused
his services to be protected speech.1 23 The court in People v. Livio
framed the case as one that involved two "fundamental" principles in
conflict: "a person's right to say what is on his or her mind, versus
another person's right to be left alone." 124 The court resolved the
matter for the former because, as it explained, the defendant's slurs,
even though "offensive and uncalled for," did not fit into the statuto-
rily prohibited categories of fighting words, threats, or obscenity.125
Rather, as the court said, when "[t]aken in context, 'nigger' is not
equivalent to 'fighting words.' It is only where words are utilized as a
deliberate challenge to a breach of the peace . . . that a prosecution
may lie."1 26
The Livio court seemed to premise its finding of protected
speech on the notion that the defendant's epithets lacked the neces-
sary "calculated" intent to provoke others to violence.1 27 Indeed, as
the court characterized it, the defendant's statement "was not con-
firmed by any other words or acts showing that it was anything
more than a crude outburst after being turned down" and was simp-
ly "a natural human reaction."1 28 Concluding that the epithets were
protected speech was not necessarily wrong, but the court certainly
would have been on firmer footing had it focused on the physical dis-
tance between the defendant and the customers he insulted via tele-
phone.1 29
122 Id. at 46. See also id. ("That his views might be offensive to someone who
overheard him does not warrant a conviction for disorderly conduct.").
123 People v. Livio, 725 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788 (D. N.Y. 2000).
124 Id at 787.
125 Id. at 791.
126 Id.
127 Id
128 Id at 792.
129 See Zoril v. Cross, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71158, *1 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding as a
matter of law that it was unreasonable to arrest a man who used the words
"fucking nigger" several times during the course of a telephone call).
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Instead of focusing on the fighting words doctrine as created
by the Supreme Court, at least one court used its state constitution to
uphold the dismissal of criminal charges against a defendant accused
of using racial slurs. In State v. Harrington,10 the Oregon Court of
Appeals affirmed a lower court decision dismissing a criminal com-
plaint against a defendant who "repeatedly" called another individu-
al a "fucking nigger.""a' The defendant in Harrington was charged
under a state statute that prohibited "abusive or obscene words or
gestures in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly re-
sponse," and the court analyzed the law under an Oregon constitu-
tional provision that guaranteed "the right to speak, write or print
freely on any subject whatever."13 2 Under prior case law, as the court
explained, the state constitution's guarantee of free expression man-
dated a two-pronged analysis: first, whether the law in question was
"directed to the substance of any opinion or any subject of communi-
cation," and if so, whether the statute fell under a historical excep-
tion to the Oregon Constitution. 33 In answering the first prong in the
affirmative, the court rejected the state's argument that the statute
was aimed simply at preventing violence; rather, as the court said,
the language of the statute and the legislative commentary suggested
that the law was intended to protect listeners from abusive or ob-
scene language rather than violence.1 34 Then, under the second part
of its analysis, the court considered whether the statute could be
viewed as an exception to free expression already established when
either the U.S. Constitution or the Oregon Constitution was adopt-
ed. 35 The court then established that even if the state statute was
successfully limited to Chaplinsky's prohibition on fighting words,
the case would not be decided because, as the Oregon court stated,
Chaplinsky stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court en-
dorsed "a balancing test to determine that some forms of expression
are unworthy of constitutional protection."13 6 That approach, the Or-
130 680 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
1 Id. at 668.
132 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065(1)(b), OR. CONST. art. I, § 8).
133 Id. at 668, 669 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134 See id. at 669.
13 5 See id. at 671 (The Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1859).
136 State v. Harrington, 680 P.2d 666, 670 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
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egon Court of Appeals argued, contrasted with the Oregon Constitu-
tion's mandate that forbids legislation "restricting the right to speak
freely on any subject whatever." 37 Thus, the state constitution "pre-
cludes the state legislature or the courts from balancing away the
right to free expression," as the court concluded. 38 Furthermore, be-
cause the court did not find abusive language or even fighting words
to be sufficiently similar to mid-nineteenth century free speech ex-
clusions, such as perjury, fraud, and soliciting a duel, the statute was
invalid under the Oregon Constitution. 39
Finally, the Court of Appeals of Ohio made the broadest and
most categorical statement against racial slurs as fighting words in
State v. Dotson.140 In that case, the defendant was convicted of disor-
derly conduct after calling a police officer a "Nigger" and "Uncle
Tom" while the police officer was attempting to restore order after a
fight at a night club.141 In discussing the fighting words doctrine, the
court said that although "there is no requirement that [a listener] be
provoked to a violent response," none of the evidence admitted at
trial showed that the four police officers at the scene were incited in-
to breaching the peace.1 42 Yet, as the court admitted, the fact that
there was not a violent response could not be dispositive.14s Rather,
the court concluded that racial slurs simply could not be fighting
words as a matter of law:
Words such as "Uncle Tom" and "Nigger" are not
fighting words. Even though the use of such
words is totally abhorrent to all people, the
words, by themselves, do not rise to the level of
criminal behavior. Although such words may be
offensive to persons of all races, they do not
137 Id.
138 Id.
1 39 See id. at 670-71.
140 State v. Dotson, No. 93 C.A. 250, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5567 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 13, 1995).
141 Id. at *1-2.
142 Id. at *3.
143 Id.
20151 FIGHTING SLURS 147
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
provoke a reasonable person to an immediate
retaliatory breach of the peace.144
The Dotson court went clearly beyond the other courts discussed in
this section by categorically concluding that racial slurs are not
fighting words. However, with its caveat that slurs "by themselves"
cannot be fighting words,145 the court seemed to suggest that such
slurs coupled with some overt act may be sufficient to support a
fighting words conviction. As the next section will detail, many
courts that conclude that slurs are fighting words have examined
other circumstances in conjunction with mere speech to conclude
that the slurs in question were criminally punishable.
B. Slurs as Criminally Punishable Speech
Contrary to the cases described above, some courts have
used the fighting words doctrine to remove First Amendment pro-
tection from racial slurs in some instances. Most of these courts,
however, have used both the words themselves and accompanying
circumstances-usually a physical action or a threat-to find that
defendants had strayed into criminally sanctionable speech. Howev-
er, a few courts have argued that racial slurs are powerful enough
unto themselves to instantly provoke a reasonable person to vio-
lence and are therefore fighting words without having to consider
any other circumstances.
In the case of In re John M.,146 for example, the Court of Ap-
peals of Arizona upheld the delinquency adjudication of a juvenile
who had been accused of shouting "nigger" and "fuck you, you god
damn nigger" from a car window.147 The series of events that served
as the basis for the juvenile's adjudication involved two incidents
slightly separated in time.148 The first incident was one in which the
juvenile was accused of throwing a soda and yelling "nigger" from a
car at one victim, and a second incident was one in which the juve-
144 Id. at *4-5.
145 Id. at *4.
146 36 P.3d 772 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
147 Id. at 773.
148 Id.
148 [Vol. 14
nile yelled "fuck you, you god damn nigger" from the same car at a
different victim but did not throw anything toward the victim.14 9 Im-
portantly, the court concluded there was not enough evidence to
show that the juvenile was the person who shouted at the first vic-
tim.150 However, the court determined that the second incident alone
could sustain a juvenile adjudication under the fighting words doc-
trine.' 5 ' As the court wrote:
We agree with the State that few words convey
such an inflammatory message of racial hatred
and bigotry as the term "nigger." According to
Webster's New World Dictionary, the term is
"generally regarded as virtually taboo because
of the legacy of racial hatred that underlies the
history of its use among whites, and its continu-
ing use among a minority as a viciously hostile
epithet." . . . Consequently, [the juvenile's] direc-
tion of the word "nigger" to [the second victim],
an African-American woman, constituted a per-
sonal attack on her that was likely to provoke a
violent reaction when addressed to an ordinary
citizen of African-American descent.1 52
Therefore, as the John M. court concluded, the slur in the second in-
cident-without any overt act such as the soda throwing of the first
incident-was a fighting word due simply to the impact of the word
itself and the likelihood that the slur would produce a violent reac-
tion in the average African-American individual. 53 The Montana Su-
preme Court reached a similar conclusion in upholding a conviction
in City of Billings v. Nelson, 54 a 2014 case that involved a woman in a
car saying "[fjuck you" and "[s]pic bastard" to someone walking near
the road before leaving the area in the car. 55 In its analysis, the Mon-
149 Id.
150 See id. at 776.
1s1 Id. at 776-77.
152 Id. at 776 (internal citation omitted).
1 53 Id.
154 332 P.3d 1039 (Mont. 2014).
1ss Id. at 1042.
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tana Supreme Court concluded that, "[r]acial slurs, including 'spic,'
may be considered fighting words," but the court cautioned that the
necessary "potential to elicit an immediate violent response exists
only where the communication occurs face-to-face or in close physi-
cal proximity."' 5 6 However, the distance between the car and the lis-
tener provided the requisite closeness as the court concluded that
the victim was "close enough to recognize the women's faces and to
hear their words clearly, even though they did not 'holler' [at]
them." 57 The Court also further concluded that "spic bastard" repre-
sented a fighting word because "[t]he use of a racial slur is the type
of speech that would, by its very utterance, inflict injury and tend to
incite a breach of the peace." 58 Because the slur was used in a "face-
to-face" manner-even though the defendant was inside a car-the
Court concluded that the speech was not protected by the Constitu-
tion.1 59
Outside of criminal trials and juvenile proceedings, other
courts in various civil matters have argued that racial slurs are cate-
gorically fighting words. In Sims v. Montgomery County Commis-
sion,160 a sexual and racial discrimination suit, a federal district judge
concluded that "in these modern times, because African-Americans
are no longer taught that they are second-class citizens but rather
that they stand equal with people of all races, the term 'nigger' is of-
ten a 'fighting word."161 Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina found that the same slur "squarely falls" within the fighting
words doctrine as it upheld a decision to remove a state district at-
torney from office after "loudly and repeatedly" calling an African-
American bar patron a "nigger."1 62 According to the Court, "No fact is
more generally known than that a white man who calls a black man a
'nigger' within his hearing will hurt and anger the black man and of-
ten provoke him to confront the white man and retaliate." 63 Finally,
156 Id at 1045.
157 Id.
1 58 Id.
15 9 Id.
160 766 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
161 Id. at 1097 n. 128.
162 In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693, 695, 698 (N.C. 1996).
163 Id. at 699.
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in Lee v. Superior Court,164 the California Court of Appeal refused to
grant a man's request to change his name to "Mister Nigger" on the
grounds that the state "should not sanction a 'fighting word' as [an]
official surname." 65
Again, however, most courts concluding that slurs are
fighting words have relied on the presence of a threat or a physical
act beyond the words themselves to find slurs constitutionally un-
protected speech. Threats in these cases have ranged from the im-
plied and subtle 66 to more overt and even true threats.1 67 Likewise,
acts cited as defining elements to fighting words in these cases have
been minor, such as incidental contact,s68 and major, like causing a
serious disturbance.1 69
Threats and other statements associated with violence were
important for several courts in determining that slurs were fighting
words. In State v. Hoshijo,170 the Supreme Court of Hawaii upheld a
judgment against the University of Hawaii in a racial discrimination
suit after a student manager on the basketball team yelled, "Shut up
you f[uc]king nigger! I'm tired of hearing your shit! Shut your mouth
164 9 Cal. App. 4th 510 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
165 Id at 518. See also id. ("Needless to say, there is a strong public policy in the
State of California to prevent the utterance of 'fighting words' which tend to in-
cite an immediate breach of the peace. While appellant would not address an-
other person as a 'nigger,' simple use of the word, as appellant concedes, has the
potential for violence. In fact, if a man asks appellant his name and he answers
'Mister Nigger,' the man might think appellant was calling him 'Mister Nigger.'
Moreover, third persons, including children hearing the epithet, may be embar-
rassed, shocked or offended by simply hearing the word. This example illus-
trates how use of the name may be confusing with the potential for violence.")
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
166 See In re H.K., 778 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 2010); In re A.R., 781 N.W.2d 644 (N.D.
2010).
167 See Matter of Shane EE., 48 A.D.3d 946, 947 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) ("[W]e
shoot niggers like you in the woods").
168 See Bailey v. State, 972 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Ark. 1998) (describing how defend-
ant touched officer on the arm before saying, "Fuck you, nigger").
169 See Wichita v. Hughes, No. 61,329,1988 Kan. App. LEXIS 383, at *5-6 (Kan.
Ct. App. June 10, 1988) (describing how store customer slammed a metal rack
on a counter and grabbed another customer by the shirt after calling various
people "nigger," "Communist spic," and other slurs).
170 76 P.3d 550 (Haw. 2003).
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or I'll kick your ass!"'71 The Court determined that the statements
were not protected by the First Amendment because they were slurs
"accompanied by threats of violence."1 72 In State v. Myers,'73 the
Court of Appeals of Ohio refuted a defendant's claim that her disor-
derly conduct charge was premised only on calling another person a
"stupid n****r."1 74 Instead, the court found support for her convic-
tion in "overtly disruptive, threatening and abusive behavior"s75 as
she confronted the victim in a "physically threatening manner," told
him to "come hit on me," and "loudly proclaimed, 'n****r, I ain't
scared of you.""7 6 Finally, in the most serious and overt threat in the-
se cases, the Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division upheld
the delinquency adjudication of a juvenile, finding that the state-
ment, "[W]e shoot niggers like you in the woods," when coupled
with, "I've got a gun with your name on it," constituted fighting
words as it upheld the delinquency adjudication of a juvenile. 77
Other courts have pointed to actions in determining that
slurs were unprotected speech, but these actions have varied in se-
verity. In re J.K.P.178 and Wichita v. Hughes79 represent two of the
more serious examples of slurs losing their constitutional protection
when coupled with certain overt actions. In In re J.KP., the Court of
Appeals of Kansas upheld the delinquency adjudication of a juvenile
who called another boy a "nigger" after throwing rocks at him.18 0 The
court noted that the juvenile "clearly used the word in a tense and
antagonistic situation while the boys were yelling and throwing
rocks at each other."18 The Court of Appeals of Kansas pointed to a
similar situation in Hughes as it upheld a disorderly conduct convic-
tion for a defendant accused of calling various people "nigger,"
171 Id. at 553-54.
172 Id. at 564.
173 No. CA2012-12-027, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 3319 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4,
2014).
174 Id. at **3.
175 Id. at *11.
176 Id. at *9.
177 Matter of Shane EE., 48 A.D.3d 946, 947 (S.C.N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
178 No. 108,617, 2013 Kan. App. LEXIS 185 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
179 No. 61,329, 1988 Kan. App. LEXIS 383 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam).
180 2013 Kan. App. LEXIS 185, at *1.
181 Id. at *5.
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"Communist spic," "moustached (sic) fag," "son of a bitch," "mother-
fucker," and "criminal cop."1 8 2 The words, however, were "accompa-
nied by the slamming of a metal rack down onto a counter and the
grabbing of a store customer by the shirt."183 When the slurs and in-
sults were "considered in conjunction with the actions," the court
concluded they amounted to fighting words under Chaplinsky.184
Other courts, however, have upheld convictions or juvenile
adjudications for the use of fighting words in conjunction with less
serious actions. In Bailey v. State,8 s the Arkansas Supreme Court up-
held a disorderly conduct conviction under the fighting words doc-
trine after a defendant stood and grabbed a police officer's arm in
addition to saying, "Fuck you, nigger, and fuck you, too."1 86 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court concluded that the slur and other profanities,
"when considering his surrounding conduct, such as standing up and
grabbing [the officer's] arm," were properly considered fighting
words, as the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded. 8 7 A dissenting
justice, however, found the surrounding conduct to be lacking in Bai-
ley and suggested the defendant was improperly convicted for a per
se use of a fighting word.188 Additionally, in two separate cases, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota seemed to suggest that the bar for
conduct that serves to define prohibited fighting words is a low
threshold. 8 9 In In re H.K.,19o the Court upheld a juvenile's delinquen-
cy adjudication after she told a teen to "'watch out' because she
'owns this town' and does not want 'niggers' in it."191 The Court sug-
gested that the words were constitutionally unprotected in part be-
cause they were threatening but also because the juvenile "followed
182 Hughes at *5-6.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 972 S.W.2d 239 (Ark. 1998).
186 Id. at 241.
187 Id. at 245.
188 Bailey v. State, 972 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Ark. 1998) (Newbern, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("Even racial slurs are not 'automatically' to be viewed
as fighting words.").
189 See In re H.K., 778 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 2010); In re A.R., 781 N.W.2d 644 (N.D.
2010).
190 778 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 2010).
191 Id. at 770.
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[the teen] into the bathroom" and yelled at her.192 The Court similar-
ly upheld another delinquency adjudication in the case of In re A.R.193
after a juvenile yelled "stupid nigger" at another teen.1 94 In that case,
the Court found the juvenile's speech constituted a fighting word be-
cause he was "a member of [a] group that circled around" the teen
before the juvenile called her a slur.95 "[T]he conduct accompanying
the speech," as the Court concluded, "takes it outside of the First
Amendment protections."19 6
These cases illustrate the variety of approaches courts take
when examining racial slurs in the context of fighting words. Some
courts have found slurs to be categorically protected as mere insults,
while other courts have determined that slurs are almost per se
fighting words. Other courts probe more deeply into the surrounding
factual context, often relying on the presence of threatening lan-
guage or overt actions in determining that slurs represent fighting
words. In the latter case, these overt actions may be rather minimal,
suggesting that any act when coupled with a racial slur may be suffi-
cient to elevate an insult into the realm of a constitutionally unpro-
tected fighting word. After examining the descriptive question of
whether slurs are treated as fighting words by courts, this Article
now turns toward the normative issue of whether slurs should be
deemed fighting words.
V. SHOULD RACIAL SLURS BE FIGHTING WORDS? A HELPFUL
EXAMINATION OF RACIALLY-BASED DEFAMATION
In answering the question of whether slurs should be con-
sidered fighting words, it is helpful to compare this area of the law to
race and defamation law. In his 2010 article Negro Blood in His Veins:
The Development and Disappearance of the Doctrine of Defamation
192 Id.
193 781 N.W.2d 644 (N.D. 2010).
194 Id. at 645.
s9 5 Id. at 649-50.
196 Id. at 650.
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Per Se by Racial Misidentification in the American South,197 scholar
Samuel Brenner traced the emergence and subsequent death of an
unusual tort in American law-"defamation per se by racial misiden-
tification."s98 This "morally egregious" legal action allowed individu-
als to sue for civil damages when white plaintiffs were incorrectly
identified as being African-American or having such ancestry.1 99 Def-
amation, as Brenner explained, traditionally consists of a false
statement about an individual that lowers that person's standing in
the community and deters others from associating with them,
whereas per se defamation is a category of such loathsome associa-
tion that "all that need be proved is the utterance of the words, and
because of their character the law will presume damages and dis-
pense with the showing of actual special damages as a necessity for
recovery."200 Thus, the tort of defamation per se by racial misidenti-
fication enshrined into law the idea that merely being called African-
American or having African-American ancestors was as damaging to
one's reputation as untrue allegations of crime, sexual misconduct,
vile disease, or allegations reflecting poorly upon business, trade, or
office. 20' Brenner wrote that the cause of action, which persisted as
accepted law until the 1950s, 2 0 2 eventually died out due to a shift
away from the acceptance of per se defamation, the disappearance of
"state-sponsored racism," and Supreme Court decisions that gave
First Amendment protections to otherwise defamatory speech re-
garding "public figures or matters of public concern." 203 Still, the fact
remains that courts in Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Louisiana, and South Carolina accepted as a matter of
law-and without any further proof-that it was injurious to a white
197 Samuel Brenner, Negro Blood in His Veins: The Development and Disappear-
ance of the Doctrine of Defamation Per Se by Racial Misidentification in the Amer-
ican South, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333 (2010).
198 Id. at 334.
199 Id. at 334-35.
200 Id. at 339-40.
201 Id. at 335, 340.
202 See Id. at 334-36, 348-49.
203 Id. at 392.
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person's reputation to accuse them of being African-American, 204 a
conclusion that remains racist and morally offensive.
The idea that racial identity or association could be defama-
tory persisted in other cases. In Polygram Records v. Superior
Court,2 0 5 the California Court of Appeals rejected the notion that a
wine's association with African-American consumers could possibly
be defamatory as a matter of law. 2 0 6 The dispute in Polygram Records
began with a comedic performance by Robin Williams that included
a joke about wine:
Whoa -- White Wine. This is a little wine here. If
it's not wine it's been through somebody al-
ready. Oh. -- There are White wines, there are
Red wines, but why are there no Black wines
like: Reggie, a Motherfucker. It goes with fish,
meat, any damn thing it wants to. I like my wine
like I like my women, ready to pass out.2 0 7
After Williams' joke was released on an album and HBO special, Da-
vid Rege, an African-American winemaker, sued, claiming trade libel
and personal defamation. 208 Rege's claim for defamation "rest[ed] in
part on the argument that Williams' joke 'associates "Rege" brand
wines with blacks, allegedly a socio-economic group of persons
commonly considered to be the antithesis of wine connoisseurs who
harbor obviously unsophisticated tastes in wines."' 2 0 9 While the
court's decision to dismiss the suit rested primarily on the fact that
Williams' performance was in a comedic setting so no reasonable
audience member would take the joke as an assertion of fact,210 the
court also attacked Rege's racially-based defamation argument as
204 See id. at 375-76 (listing states that accepted doctrine of defamation per se
by racial misidentification).
205 170 Cal. App. 3d 543 (Cal. Rptr. 1985).
20 6 See id. at 557-58.
207 Id. at 546-47 (quoting Williams' performance) (changing of the spelling of
"Reggie" to "Rege," the plaintiffs last name was done by the court, but the
spelling quoted here is presumably original to the joke).
208 Id. at 546.
209 Id. at 557 (internal quotations omitted).
2 10 See id. at 555-57.
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"utterly untenable." 211 As the court argued, "Rege's contention that
the joke disparaged his wine products by associating them with
blacks is repugnant to values embedded in our Constitution and
must be resoundingly rejected." 212
In short, there is something profoundly racist and disturbing
in accepting racial misidentification or association as grounds for
defamation. By signaling that some topic or accusation is defamato-
ry, such as crime or a loathsome disease, we pass judgment as a soci-
ety on those things. To reward a plaintiff under the law for being
misidentified as a minority or for having some association with a mi-
nority is to say that being a minority is something to be shunned.
Clearly, in the 21st century, the law cannot abide such an inherently
racist declaration.
Yet, this fundamental problem does not exist with the
fighting words doctrine as applied to racial slurs. Indeed, to say that
a racial slur is a fighting word serves to infantilize the person that it
is directed toward because we are making a decision under the law
that such an individual is incapable of restraint. Society, therefore,
must punish the speaker before the listener resorts to violence.
However, that infantilization is applicable to the entire fighting
words doctrine. As Harvard Law School Professor Randall L. Kenne-
dy noted, the fighting words doctrine weakens the "salutary mes-
sage" that individuals should have discipline in the face of taunts. 2 13
Again, though, this is a dispiriting assumption that all individuals-
when faced with the right insult or set of circumstances-lack the
necessary self-control to avoid a physical confrontat ion. Nothing
about designating racial slurs as fighting words serves to single out
minorities as lacking control or needing protection. Rather, the
fighting words doctrine as a whole does that for all people.
Therefore, in answering the question of whether racial slurs
should be deemed fighting words, it is at least worth considering the
fact that, unlike racial identity and defamation law, there is nothing
211 Id. at 557.
212 Id. at 558.
213 Randall L. Kennedy, "Nigger!" as a Problem in the Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
935, 943 (2001).
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inherently racist or discriminatory about designating slurs as
fighting words. Whatever damage to notions of self-control such a
determination does, that damage is not done to minorities alone.
VI. CONCLUSION
With its decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Su-
preme Court created the fighting words exception to the First
Amendment. As that decision has been refined by the Court and ap-
plied by lower courts across the country, the general scope of the
doctrine is clear in that it covers words said in a close physical prox-
imity that are likely to cause average individuals to retaliate with vi-
olence.
However, what is less clear is the boundary between mere
insults that individuals are expected to bear and words that are
criminally prohibitable as fighting words. Courts examining this
question as applied to racial slurs have generally reached three con-
clusions: racial slurs are categorically not fighting words, slurs are
definitely fighting words, or slurs are fighting words in the right ver-
bally or physically threatening situations.
In answering the question of whether slurs should be con-
sidered fighting words, there is nothing inherently damaging to mi-
norities in criminalizing this specific subset of speech, as our notions
of self-control and restraint are all damaged equally by the fighting
words doctrine. Therefore, if the Supreme Court continues to find
that fighting words are an exception to the First Amendment, there is
nothing to say that racial slurs should not be considered part of that
classification.
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